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Executive Summary (in Dutch) 
Verticale beleidsintegratie is een van de belangrijkste governancevereisten voor duurzame ont-
wikkeling. Het internationale beleidsdiscours van duurzame ontwikkeling toont een consensus 
over het feit dat alle governanceniveaus inspanningen moeten doen voor duurzame ontwikke-
ling en hun beleidsinitiatieven moeten afstemmen op elkaar. Ook in wetenschappelijke litera-
tuur komt verticale beleidsintegratie voor duurzame ontwikkeling als verplichting naar voor. 
Het wordt daarin omschreven als beleidscoherentie over governanceniveaus heen, door linken 
te creëren tussen de verschillende niveaus of door te evolueren naar gecoördineerd beleid. Als 
men beleidsintegratie tussen subnationale en nationale overheden bekijkt, kunnen vier ver-
schillende mechanismen onderscheiden worden: 
 betrokkenheid bij algemene consultatieprocessen voor duurzame ontwikkeling; 
 lidmaatschap van of betrokkenheid in raden voor duurzame ontwikkeling en/of 
interministeriële of interdepartementele commissies voor duurzame ontwikkeling; 
 geïnstitutionaliseerde mechanismen voor betere coördinatie; en 
 linken tussen nationale strategieën voor duurzame ontwikkeling en subnationale initiatie-
ven. 
Die verschillende mechanismen kunnen instrumenten voor intergouvernementele relaties van 
verschillende aard zijn: 
 structurele instrumenten: maken gebruik van patronen van verantwoordelijkheden, autori-
teit en leiderschap; 
 programma-instrumenten: maken gebruik van vb. geld en programma’s; 
 onderzoeks- en capaciteitsinstrumenten: doelen op capaciteitsopbouw; en 
 gedragsinstrumenten: maken vooral gebruik van gerichte communicatie om conflicten te 
vermijden. 
Het opzet van deze paper is om te bestuderen hoe subnationale overheden omgaan met verti-
cale beleidsintegratie voor duurzame ontwikkeling. De assumptie die daarbij wordt nagegaan is 
dat hun houding in hoge mate bepaald wordt door hun graad van autonomie. Die assumptie 
vloeit voor uit de literatuur over governance voor duurzame ontwikkeling. Daarin wordt im-
mers benadrukt dat ‘verdeelde macht’ een betekenisvolle invloed heeft op duurzameontwikke-
lingsbeleid. De verdeling van bevoegdheden binnen een land en de autonomie van zijn subna-
tionale overheden is daar een onderdeel van. In comparatieve analyses van nationaal duurza-
meontwikkelingsbeleid komt men tot de conclusie dat verdeelde bevoegdheden (vooral in fe-
derale landen) problemen met zich mee brengen, onder meer op het vlak van beleidscoheren-
tie. Aan de andere kant kan de autonomie van subnationale overheden ook opportuniteiten 
creëren, vb. wanneer de nationale overheid weinig aandacht besteedt aan het beleidsthema. In 
deze paper wordt niet uitgegaan van het onderscheid tussen federale en niet-federale landen 
om autonomie te meten, maar van de Regional Authority Index (2008). Die bestaat uit twee on-
derdelen: self-rule (de onafhankelijkheid van subnationale overheden om autoriteit uit te oefe-
nen binnen hun eigen grenzen) en shared rule (de capaciteit die ze hebben om nationaal beleid te 
beïnvloeden). De analyse vergelijkt de ervaringen van Noord-Holland, Noordrijn-Westfalen, 
Vlaanderen en Québec, die zeer uiteenlopende scores hebben op de twee componenten van de 
Regional Authority Index (zie tabel 1).  
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Tabel 1 Graad van autonomie van de geselecteerde cases 
 self-rule 
(maximum: 15) 
shared rule 
(maximum: 9) 
Noord-Holland 8 6.5 
Noordrijn-Westfalen 12 9 
Vlaanderen 13 7 
Québec 15 5 
De analyse wordt gestuurd door twee vragen: In welke mate bepaalt self-rule het duurzameont-
wikkelingsbeleid van de subnationale overheden (m.a.w. moeten ze het nationale
1
 beleid 
uitvoeren of hebben ze de capaciteit om hun eigen beleid uit te stippelen)? En in welke mate 
bepaalt shared rule hoe subnationale overheden het nationale duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid 
kunnen beïnvloeden? De casestudies beschrijven eerst de graad van autonomie van de subnati-
onale overheden en het duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid in elke case (zowel op nationaal als op 
subnationaal niveau). Daarna wordt ingegaan op de twee onderzoeksvragen. 
In de vier casestudies werden maar weinig mechanismen voor verticale beleidsintegratie 
voor duurzame ontwikkeling geobserveerd. In Nederland bestaat er een link tussen het natio-
nale en subnationale beleid door middel van het programma Leren voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling. 
Dit nationaal gefinancierde programma ondersteunt duurzameontwikkelingsprojecten in de 
provincies en organiseert activiteiten gericht op capaciteitsopbouw bij de provinciale overhe-
den. Het is dus een programma- en een onderzoeks-/capaciteitsinstrument. Het programma is 
echter maar in geringe mate verbonden met het nationale duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid. In 
België en Duitsland zijn structurele instrumenten aan het werk. In Duitsland werd onlangs een 
initiatief genomen om tot betere coördinatie te komen tussen de Länder en de federale strategie 
voor duurzame ontwikkeling, maar Noordrijn-Westfalen neemt er niet aan deel. Vlaanderen is 
betrokken bij twee instellingen op federaal niveau, de Interdepartementale Commissie Duur-
zame Ontwikkeling en de Federale Raad voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling. In de case van Québec 
werden geen mechanismen gevonden. Over het algemeen lijkt verticale beleidsintegratie voor 
duurzame ontwikkeling dus zwak. Dat komt onder meer omdat intergouvernementele samen-
werking, als ze gebeurt, in de meeste gevallen zeer sectoraal georganiseerd is en weinig aan-
dacht besteedt aan transversale beleidsconcepten zoals duurzame ontwikkeling. 
In geen van de vier onderzochte cases zijn de subnationale overheden betrokken bij de im-
plementatie van het nationale duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid. Dat is vooral verrassend in het 
geval van Noord-Holland en Noordrijn-Westfalen, omdat de verdeling van de bevoegdheden 
in Nederland en Duitsland er meestal voor zorgt dat de subnationale overheden verantwoor-
delijk zijn voor een groot deel van de uitvoering van het nationale beleid. Dat is echter niet het 
geval voor duurzame ontwikkeling, hoewel de Nederlandse en Duitse strategieën ook thema’s 
aanhalen die grotendeels subnationale bevoegdheden zijn. In de cases Vlaanderen en Québec 
is het duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid van het federale en subnationale niveau volledig geïsoleerd 
van elkaar. Er is dus geen rechtstreeks oorzakelijk verband met de graad van self-rule van de 
                                                 
1 In de literatuur verwijst de term ‘nationaal’ naar de centrale overheid. In een Duitse, Belgische en 
Canadese beleidscontext wordt de term echter doorgaans gebruikt als zowel de subnationale en de 
federale overheid betrokken zijn. In de paper wordt dan ook meestal de term ‘federaal’ gebruikt om 
de centrale overheid in die drie cases aan te duiden. 
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subnationale overheden. In elk van de vier onderzochte cases voeren de subnationale overhe-
den een eigen duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid, binnen de grenzen van hun bevoegdheden. 
Wat de betrokkenheid in nationale besluitvorming voor duurzame ontwikkeling betreft, kan 
enkel Vlaanderen invloed uitoefenen, hoewel het niet de hoogste graad van shared rule heeft. De 
Vlaamse overheid maakt veelvuldig gebruik van de mechanismen die het ter beschikking heeft, 
al valt dat voor een deel (maar niet volledig) te verklaren vanuit de Vlaamse strategie om te 
waken over de eigen bevoegdheden en te controleren dat de federale overheid niets onder-
neemt wat onder subnationale bevoegdheden valt. In de andere cases werd geen poging tot 
beïnvloeding gevonden. Noord-Holland heeft wel enkele mechanismen om nationaal beleid te 
beïnvloeden, maar die worden niet gebruikt voor duurzame ontwikkeling. In Duitsland hebben 
de Länder niet de mogelijkheid om de federale strategie te beïnvloeden. Noordrijn-Westfalen 
heeft echter op dit moment geen eigen afgelijnd duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid en toont ook 
geen interesse om het federale te beïnvloeden. Québec kan geen invloed uitoefenen op het 
Canadese duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid, en wenst dat ook niet te doen. De graad van shared 
rule heeft geen betekenisvolle invloed op de manier waarop subnationale overheden het natio-
nale duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid kunnen beïnvloeden. Dat komt vooral omdat de index meet 
hoeveel macht de subnationale overheden hebben in nationale wetgeving, en in de onder-
zochte cases vindt nationaal duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid grotendeels buiten de parlementen 
plaats. 
De paper toont aan dat de graad van autonomie in de vier cases niet verklaart hoe subnatio-
nale overheden omgaan met de internationale verplichting van verticale beleidsintegratie voor 
duurzame ontwikkeling. Andere factoren, zoals politieke kenmerken, lijken meer doorslagge-
vend. Toch blijkt dat de graad van self-rule belangrijk is, nl. voor beleidsinhoud. Elke overheid 
voert immers een duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid binnen de grenzen van zijn eigen bevoegdhe-
den, hoe groot of hoe klein zijn autonomie ook is. De analyse toont aan dat vooral voor natio-
nale overheden in landen waar de autonomie van subnationale overheden groot is, dat proble-
matisch kan zijn. Zo wordt het duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid van de federale overheden van 
België en Canada in sterke mate beperkt door hun geringe bevoegdheden. 
Een interessant aandachtspunt voor de Vlaamse context is ook dat er in de andere federale 
cases, Duitsland en Canada, geen nationale strategie voor duurzame ontwikkeling bestaat, en er 
ook geen pogingen worden ondernomen om er een te ontwikkelen. Die internationale ver-
plichting lijkt in Duitsland en Canada minder zwaar door te wegen dan in België. Ook het feit 
dat de twee landen geografisch uitgestrekt zijn en elk meer dan tien subnationale overheden 
tellen (met elk hun eigen politieke preferenties), blijkt ten dele te verklaren waarom er weinig 
coördinatie voor duurzame ontwikkeling plaatsvindt.  
Het vernieuwende perspectief dat deze paper biedt, nl. de analyse van verticale beleidsinte-
gratie vanuit het oogpunt van subnationale overheden, toont aan dat niet alleen nationale 
overheden verantwoordelijk kunnen gesteld worden voor een gebrek aan verticale beleidsinte-
gratie voor duurzame ontwikkeling. Subnationale overheden moeten eveneens hun verant-
woordelijkheid opnemen. Ook in België kan door de verschillende overheden een grotere in-
spanning geleverd worden om tot meer verticale beleidsintegratie te komen. De ontwikkeling 
van een nationale langetermijnvisie, voorzien in de wijziging van de wet duurzame ontwikke-
ling, biedt daarvoor een opportuniteit. 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainable development (SD) needs to be tackled at different levels of governance, from 
global to local. The research in this paper approaches SD from the perspective of subnational 
governments.
2
 It zooms in on vertical policy integration, one of the key governance require-
ments of SD (Steurer, 2009). Previous research addressing vertical policy integration mainly 
departs from the national level of governance. Yet another important question, and in my view 
an understudied one, is how subnational governments deal with the challenge of vertical policy 
integration for SD. In order to understand the complex interplay between national and subna-
tional governments in the area of SD, and their link to other levels of governance, knowing 
which mechanisms exist at the national level to involve subnational governments is not 
enough. We also need to know how and why subnational governments use certain opportuni-
ties, and how their involvement in mechanisms for vertical policy integration is shaped. The 
assumption studied in this paper is that their stance toward vertical policy integration for SD is 
determined by their degree of autonomy, i.e. the authority that they can exercise within their 
own jurisdictions and vis-à-vis national policy and decision-making.  
The paper starts with a conceptual reflection on vertical policy integration for SD and on the 
degree of autonomy of subnational governments. Subsequently, four cases are compared: 
North Holland (the Netherlands), North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Flanders (Belgium) and 
Quebec (Canada). The comparative analysis then serves to identify patterns of vertical policy 
integration and to verify the link with the subnational governments’ degrees of autonomy. 
Overall, this paper aims to gain insights into the problem of vertical policy integration for SD, 
by approaching it from a new angle, the one of subnational governments. 
2. Vertical policy integration for sustainable development 
While the multiple interpretations, uses and abuses of SD seem to uncover a lack of consensus 
about its meaning, nobody seems to contest the fact that SD is about integration. Integration, 
indeed, is one of the most commonly cited policy principles of SD (Bruyninckx, 2006, p. 268; 
Steurer, 2009, p. 4; Zaccaï, 2002, p. 39). Policy integration, it is said, should be both horizontal 
(among different policy domains) as well as vertical (across different levels of governance). The 
emphasis on policy integration in the SD paradigm should not be surprising, since the lack of 
policy integration — i.e. the tendency to develop sectoral policies independently from one an-
other and in an isolated manner vis-à-vis other levels of governance — is one of the main 
causes of the problems which SD aims to resolve (Bornemann, 2008).  
In this paper, my interest goes out to vertical policy integration. Since the very conception of 
SD, the integration of policies among different levels of governance has been called for in 
many international policy documents. Indeed, the World Conservation Strategy, where the concept 
of SD appears prominently for the first time, already hints at integration across different gov-
ernmental levels (IUCN 1980, §8.1). The Brundtland Report, which put SD conceptually on the 
map, does not explicitly address vertical policy integration. It is mainly aimed at giving policy 
guidance to national governments, while also stressing the need for international cooperation 
and local initiatives. Yet on a few occasions Brundtland does point out the need for a change 
                                                 
2 This paper reflects a part of a PhD project on governance for SD at the subnational level. The aut-
hor seeks to compare the policies of Flanders, Wallonia, North Rhine-Westphalia, North Holland 
and Quebec and to identify the factors influencing subnational SD policies. The research is funded 
by the Flemish Policy Research Centre for SD (2007-2011) (www.steunpuntDO.be). 
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of paradigm ‘at all levels’, without further specification (World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED), 1987) (WCED 1987, p. xiv, 62). In contrast to the Brundtland Re-
port, Agenda 21, the global action plan agreed at the 1992 Rio Summit, is slightly more explicit, 
calling for ‘the integration of economic, social and environmental considerations in decision-
making at all levels’ (UNCED 1992, §8.4a, see also §8.4c). It also prescribes that national 
governments cooperate with international organizations to strengthen the capacity for policy 
integration at all levels (UNCED 1992, §8.12). Five years later, a special session of the General 
Assembly, ‘Rio+5’, urged for increased vertical policy integration. It warned that SD would not 
be achieved ‘without greater integration at all policy-making levels and at operational levels, 
including the lowest administrative levels possible’ (UNGASS 1997, §24). At the 2002 
Johannesburg Summit, policy-makers again stressed the involvement of all levels of govern-
ance and called for integrated approaches and for strengthened coherence (WSSD 2002, e.g. 
§21, §139). The global call for integrated action at all levels is echoed by the OECD, which has 
published many authoritative guidelines on SD policies. In its reports, the OECD pleads for a 
real integration of the efforts of different levels of governance, notably to achieve a successful 
implementation of global commitments (OECD, 2001a, p. 51; 2002a, p. 19, 33; 2002b, p. 3, 6). 
The previous overview shows a broad consensus within international policy documents on 
the fact that coherent action at all levels of governance is needed to pursue the SD agenda. 
That is why SD has often been approached through the analytical paradigm of Multi-Level 
Governance. That framework, traditionally used in the analysis of EU policy-making, studies 
governance processes as an interaction between different governmental levels that are interde-
pendent, and in which nation-states are not the sole actors anymore. A distinction is made here 
between the global, the regional (e.g. European), the national, the subnational
3
 and the local 
(or municipal) levels of governance. In a multi-level setting, all those levels have their own 
stake and responsibilities in governance for SD. Global multilateral institutions, especially the or-
ganizations of the UN system, fulfil a key promoting role. Those organizations play an impor-
tant part in agenda-setting and the definition of global goals, and they function as significant 
information-sharing platforms (Van den Brande, 2009, p. 3). They are also the ones that set out 
deadlines that other actors should observe, e.g. with regard to the development of national 
Strategies for SD (SSDs).
4
 Regional organizations play a similar role and often function as 
intermediaries between global multilateral institutions and national governments. In Europe, 
for example, the EU SD Strategy is said to have influenced the policies of lower levels, notably 
with regard to the thematic challenges (Paredis, 2008, p. 13-14; RIMAS 2009, p. 40). Moreover, 
authors have observed the role of the EU’s Structural Funds in promoting SD through capac-
ity-building at the subnational level (Berger, 2003, p. 228; Berger and Steurer, 2008, p. 45). As 
                                                 
3 I define a subnational entity as ‘a coherent territorial entity situated between local and national levels 
with a capacity for authoritative decision-making’ (Marks et al., 2008, p. 113). This entails entities 
such as provinces, (micro-)regions or states. I use the term ‘region(al)’, in contrast, to denote the 
level of governance above the nation-state, e.g. the EU, as is common in International Relations 
theory and the literature on global governance. 
4 In Agenda 21 national governments agreed to develop a national SSD (UNCED 1992, §8.7). In 
1997, Rio+5 set 2002 as the deadline for the adoption of the SSDs (UNGASS 1997, §24a). The 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation prescribes governments to start implementing their Strate-
gies by 2005 (WSSD 2002, §162b). SSDs are meant to harmonize existing strategies and plans ope-
rating in a specific country and could be seen as the main formulation of a government’s intention 
to embed SD in its policies. Yet SSDs are only one component of governance for SD, as Meadow-
croft (2007, p. 158) points out. 
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for national governments, although Multi-Level Governance de-emphasizes their role, they still 
retain the key responsibility of steering their societies in a more sustainable direction, in coop-
eration with non-governmental actors and lower levels of governance (Dryzek, 2005, p. 155-
156; Jörgensen, 2004, p. 29; OECD, 2001b, p. 27). The role of subnational governments is signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, they are often responsible for the implementation of national and 
international policies with regard to SD (Jörgensen, 2007, p. 156; OECD, 2001a, p. 51; 2002a, 
p. 19). Second, they are said to be closer to citizens and stakeholders, which is vital for any SD 
process (Baker et al., 1997, p. 22; Berger, 2003, p. 226; Jörgensen, 2002, p. 1-2). Berger and 
Steurer (2008, p. 32) therefore consider subnational entities as the ideal level to tackle prob-
lems related to SD. Finally, more than the subnational level, the level of local authorities (mostly 
municipalities) has received wide attention. Notably because of their ability to bring together 
citizens and important stakeholders within a specific local context, the efforts of local authori-
ties are considered to contribute in a crucial way to the global SD agenda (Brugmann, 1996; 
Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005, p. 44). The most visible application at the local level is the spread of 
Local Agenda 21 initiatives to translate the global concept of SD into a local setting (Lafferty, 
2001). In addition, cities and municipalities join in transnational associations (e.g. ICLEI) to 
exchange best practices and express their voice in global policy and decision-making 
(Bouteligier, 2008; Bruyninckx, 2006, p. 281-282). 
In a Multi-Level Governance framework, it is thus clear that all levels of governance play 
their part in the pursuit of SD. A general trend is that higher levels are expected to set goals 
and directions and to provide ‘steering’, while lower levels are mainly looked at in terms of 
concrete implementation and context-specific solutions. It is important to point out, however, 
that the main global policy documents advance the demand for vertical policy integration 
mainly as an obligation for sovereign national governments. That is not surprising, in the view 
that national governments are the main actors negotiating international action and that as gate-
keepers they can decide how to organize cooperation with lower levels of governance within 
their own borders. 
Yet the international texts remain fairly vague on what vertical policy integration really con-
sists of. It thus seems useful to turn to the academic world and gain insights from existing 
characterizations of this form of policy integration. Brown specifies that vertical policy inte-
gration ‘implies linking discrete levels of governance, from local to international, and institu-
tions across different levels’ (Brown, 2009, p. 38, emphasis added). Berger and Steurer have a 
more concrete characterization, referring to vertical policy integration as ‘the coordination of 
various policies between the different levels of government’ (Berger and Steurer, 2008, p. 31, 
emphasis added). A recent study commissioned by the Committee of the Regions identifies 
‘coordination in objective-setting, competence distribution and development of provisions and 
measures across multiple tiers of government’ as the content of vertical policy integration 
(RIMAS 2009, p. 64). Berger and Steurer specify that such coordination has the aim ‘to achieve 
coherence between activities at the different political levels, from policy generation to imple-
mentation’ (Berger and Steurer, 2008, p. 31, emphasis added). Similarly, Bruyninckx under-
stands the principle of vertical policy integration as ‘the need to come to better policy coher-
ence between different levels of policy-making and implementation’ (Bruyninckx, 2006, p. 
269). The notion of coherence is in agreement with Underdal’s criterion of consistency. In 
what is said to be the first academic treatment of policy integration, Underdal stipulates that 
integrated policies need to be consistent, meaning that all policy components, including across 
different levels of governance, are in accord with each other (Underdal 1980: 159, cited in 
Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, p. 8). 
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A literature scan thus points out that scholars understand vertical policy integration as the 
coherence of policies across levels of governance by means of establishing linkages between 
them, or evolving towards genuine coordinated policy-making (which comprises objective-set-
ting, competence distribution and the development of instruments).
5
 How vertical policy 
integration for SD should take place, however, appears underdeveloped by researchers. Only a 
few authors develop such an operationalization. Berger and Steurer (2008, p. 31), for example, 
put forward that vertical policy integration can involve mechanisms such as framework legisla-
tion and coordinating bodies. In a recent study on the contributions of subnational (and local) 
authorities in national SD processes within the EU, Berger and Sedlacko (2009) identify four 
types of involvement:  
 involvement in general consultation processes for SD; 
 membership or involvement in SD councils and/or in interministerial or interdepartmental 
SD committees; 
 institutionalized mechanisms for better coordination; and 
 links between national SSDs and subnational SD activities. 
In the literature on federalism (e.g. Meekison, 2002; Swenden, 2006, p. 188-241) and in the 
field of public administration (e.g. Peters and Pierre, 2001; Radin, 2003), scholars study the 
phenomenon of intergovernmental relations. Although they are not primarily concerned with 
strategies for increased vertical policy integration, the insights of their field of study can also be 
interesting for the purpose of this paper. Radin, for instance, identifies four categories of in-
struments for intergovernmental relations: 
 structural instruments, which use patterns of responsibilities, authorities and leadership to 
shape intergovernmental relations; these instruments involve inter alia commissions or other 
institionalized mechanisms aimed at coordination; 
 programmatic instruments, using resources and redesign of programs and grant types; 
 research and capacity-building instruments, involving ‘empowerment’; 
 behavioural instruments, which mostly involve targeted communication in order to prevent 
intergovernmental conflicts (Radin, 2003). 
Those different instruments can also function as mechanisms for better policy coherence in 
the area of SD. In combination with the mechanisms identified by Berger and Sedlacko they 
will be used to guide the description of the case studies, which focus on the relation between 
the subnational and the national level of governance. Intergovernmental relations and vertical 
policy integration for SD are indeed linked. Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000b) demonstrate 
that central governments in general have taken steps to involve subnational levels in govern-
ance for SD, albeit in different ways. The pattern according to which that interaction takes 
place depends on the character of intergovernmental linkages operating in a certain country. 
They show, moreover, that in some countries SD has been invoked to justify shifts of duties 
                                                 
5 The understanding of vertical policy integration in this paper differs from that of some other 
authors, such as Lafferty and Hovden (2003, p. 12-14), who use the term ‘vertical (environmental) 
policy integration’ to denote coherence within a single policy domain at a certain level of gover-
nance, from ministerial commitment down to concrete implementation on the ground. Bornemann 
(2008, p. 15) names that phenomenon ‘intra-policy integration’. Steurer and Martinuzzi (2005, p. 
461) call it ‘cross-horizontal integration’. 
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between different levels,
6
 although it has never led to major transformations in 
intergovernmental relations (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 2000b, p. 373-375).   
Not surprisingly, a large part of the research already conducted approaches vertical policy 
integration for SD from the perspective of national governments. It usually concludes that 
vertical policy integration is weak and more efforts should be undertaken to strengthen it 
(Berger and Steurer, 2008, p. 46; Niestroy, 2005, p. 33; Steurer and Martinuzzi, 2005, p. 462). 
In this paper, I want to investigate how the issue of vertical policy integration for SD is being 
tackled by subnational governments. I believe such an approach might be able to offer some 
new insights into this issue, which, although it is critical in the pursuit of SD, still generates 
more questions than solutions. My assumption is that the position of subnational governments 
towards vertical policy integration for SD is to a large extent determined by their degree of 
autonomy and by the competences that they have. Those factors are cited as a major deter-
mining variable of subnational policies within the literature on comparative regionalism and 
federalism (Keating and McEwen, 2005, p. 417; Marks et al., 2008, p. 111; McEwen, 2005, p. 
550). The argument is developed in the next section. 
3. Sustainable development and the question of  autonomy 
In the study on governance for SD, several leading authors have pointed out that the distribu-
tion of power is an important factor to consider. Meadowcroft (2008, p. 113), for instance, ar-
gues that ‘distributed power’ can be an obstacle for the steering capacity of states which he 
considers vital in the pursuit of SD (see also Berger, 2003). Distributed power, of course, is a 
very broad problem and can be understood in different contexts. It can mean, for example, 
distribution of competences (or responsibilities) between different levels of governance, be-
tween governments and non-governmental actors, or between different actors within a single 
government. Only one specific aspect of distributed power is looked at in this paper, i.e. the 
distribution of competences between the national and subnational governments of a particular 
country. That distribution of competences is where subnational governments derive their 
autonomy from. 
In comparative research on national SD policies the distribution of competences is men-
tioned as an important determining factor. It has been suggested, for instance, that federal 
countries encounter more problems regarding vertical policy integration than non-federal or 
unitary countries. Such problems arise notably with regard to the effectiveness of intergovern-
mental coordination or the reconciliation of national and subnational priorities, with an inco-
herence of policies as a result (Bachus et al., 2004, p. 247; Jörgensen, 2002, p. 4; Lafferty and 
Meadowcroft, 2000a, p. 427; 2000b, p. 375; OECD, 2002a, p. 20-21). Furthermore, the OECD 
(2001b, p. 45) warns that the distribution of competences with regard to SD can lead to 
overlapping or competing strategies and to the waste of administrative and intellectual re-
sources. The OECD therefore argues that a decentralization of responsibilities to the subna-
tional level requires a strong effort for vertical policy integration (OECD, 2001a, p. 51). Never-
theless, scholars also indicate that the decentralization of responsibilities related to SD can be 
an opportunity. Especially in cases where national governments are reluctant to move forward 
on the issue, subnational governments can take the lead and develop innovative SD policies 
(Jörgensen, 2004, p. 31; 2007, p. 145, 154; Meadowcroft, 2008, p. 114-115). Toner and 
                                                 
6 A similar argument is made by Dryzek (2005, p. 154), who states that SD discourse often contains 
pleas for shifts in power between different levels. 
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Meadowcroft (2009, p. 81) argue that SD policies can be better adjusted to local conditions 
when subnational governments have a substantial amount of autonomy. Federal systems in 
particular have been regarded as favourable to experimentation and fostering learning about 
innovative governance approaches (Bomberg, 2004, p. 17; Jörgensen, 2007; Meadowcroft, 
2008, p. 115; see also Rose, 1991, p. 23). However, the distribution of competences with re-
gard to SD is not only an issue in federal countries. Steurer and Martinuzzi (2005, p. 462) 
rightly argue that SD cuts across different governmental levels in any country, no matter how 
centralized, notably with regard to domains such as transport or spatial planning. Moreover, 
Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000b, p. 376) demonstrate that SD has produced a growth in 
intergovernmental relations everywhere, including in unitary countries. That confirms that SD 
is by definition a multi-level issue and one in which vertical policy integration merits the atten-
tion of both policy-makers and academics.  
Both the group of federal countries and the group of unitary countries are internally very 
diverse. Moreover, the distinction does not specify what subnational governments can do with 
regard to policy-making within their own borders, which is also an important factor to con-
sider. Instead of using the federal-unitary distinction as a variable, I look at the degree of 
autonomy of subnational governments, for which federalism is not an indicator. To measure 
the degree of autonomy, I use the Regional Authority Index recently developed by Hooghe et al. 
(2008a). Based on a number of variables, this index gives an indication of the autonomy of 
subnational governments, as it intends to measure the extent to which they exercise formal 
authority. The index contains two components. Self-rule is the subnational governments’ inde-
pendence to exercise authority within their own jurisdictions. Shared rule refers to their capacity 
to shape national decision-making (Marks et al., 2008, p. 114-115).
7
 In the remainder of this 
paper, I examine the relation between the degree of autonomy of subnational governments 
and vertical policy integration for SD. I compare four subnational governments with a varying 
degree of autonomy, both with regard to self-rule as with regard to shared rule: North Holland 
(the Netherlands), North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Flanders (Belgium) and Quebec 
(Canada). Table 1 displays the scores on self-rule and shared rule of those four cases. 
Table 1 Degree of autonomy of selected cases (source: Hooghe et al., 2008a) 
 self-rule 
(maximum: 15) 
shared rule 
(maximum: 9) 
North Holland 8 6.5 
North Rhine-Westphalia 12 9 
Flanders 13 7 
Quebec 15 5 
In the analysis two research questions are addressed. First, what is the degree of autonomy of 
subnational entities within their own borders (self-rule) and how does it affect the content of 
their SD policy? Is their autonomy limited as to merely implementing national policy, or are 
they capable of designing their own policies? Second, which authority do subnational govern-
ments have to shape national decision-making (shared rule) and how does it affect their strat-
                                                 
7 Self-rule is composed by four indicators: ‘institutional depth’, ‘policy scope’, ‘fiscal autonomy’ and 
‘representation’. Shared rule consists of ‘law making’, ‘executive control’, ‘fiscal control’ and ‘con-
stitutional reform’ (Hooghe et al., 2008a). 
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egy towards the SD policy of the national government? This question allows me to investigate 
which role subnational governments play in national policy-making for SD.  
4. Case studies 
The four case studies start with a brief discussion of the degree of autonomy, both with regard 
to self-rule and shared rule, and of the practice of intergovernmental relations. Subsequently, 
the national
8
 SD policy of the country and the SD policy of the subnational government itself 
are shortly presented. Next, I investigate the role of the subnational government in the imple-
mentation of the national SD policy and how that relates to its own SD policy. Finally, I look 
at the possible influence of the subnational governments in shaping the national SD policy. 
Berger and Sedlacko’s and Radin’s classifications are used to conceptually distinguish between 
different mechanisms of vertical policy integration. In order to answer the two research ques-
tions, reference is made to the subnational governments’ degree of autonomy. The order in 
which the cases are discussed follows their increasing degree of self-rule, the first component 
of the Regional Authority Index. The empirical material for the analysis was partly distilled from 
previous analyses of (mainly national) SD policies, but above all from a large amount of inter-
views conducted in the four cases, with political and administrative officials and with experts, 
both at the national as well as at the subnational level. The list of interviewees for this paper 
can be found at the end. 
4.1 North Holland: no climate for integration 
The Dutch provinces have a low score on self-rule. The Netherlands is mostly regarded as a 
typical unitary state (Hulst, 2005). Although the provinces have an ‘open household’ — i.e. in 
principle they can act in every domain they want — their tasks are often restricted to the im-
plementation of national policies. Yet if the Netherlands is a unitary state, it is certainly a de-
centralized unitary state (Coenen, 2008, p. 191). Provinces share powers with local authorities 
in several areas going from culture to infrastructure (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 199). In addition, 
over the past decades they have increasingly been active in environmental protection, agricul-
ture and transport, and they received new tasks in social and economic policies (Hendriks, 
2001, p. 149). The most important powers of the Dutch provinces concern spatial planning 
(Hulst, 2005, p. 100; OECD, 2002a, p. 232). Their extensive spatial planning responsibilities 
give them influence in other policy areas as well. In that dynamic they assume a coordinating 
and steering role, and have enough manoeuvring space for their own policy accents. With 
those new tasks, the profile of the province is changing towards an organizing role, with the 
aim of achieving more coordination and integration (Dieperink and Driessen, 2007, p. 249; 
Driessen, 2000, p. 166-181). In recent debates, the province is often described as a ‘director’ 
(regisseur). The Dutch provinces are for instance well-equipped to mobilize relevant players 
within a specific policy issue and stimulate interaction between them (Driessen, 2000, p. 165; 
Hendriks, 2001, p. 149). Yet in their role as directors, provinces are to a large extent dependent 
on the other levels of government with regard to certain policy instruments and financial re-
sources (Dieperink and Driessen, 2007, p. 249). Their fiscal autonomy is limited (Hooghe et al., 
                                                 
8 In the German, Belgian and Canadian case studies the term ‘federal’ is used to denote the central 
government, since the notion ‘national’ has the implication of encompassing both the federal and 
the subnational governments. 
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2008b, p. 218). On shared rule, the Dutch provinces receive a relatively high score, mainly due 
to the fact that provinces are the unit of representation in the upper house of the Dutch par-
liament (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 248). In practice, however, their role in national policy and 
decision-making is small. Although different pressure mechanisms exist, cooperation between 
the national and the provincial level will usually target the implementation of policies exclu-
sively. Such cooperation often has a highly contractual character (Dieperink and Driessen, 
2007, p. 259). The Dutch provinces thus have a low degree of autonomy, but still some impor-
tant responsibilities which allow them to play a steering role. I therefore expect a high degree 
of vertical policy integration in the case of North Holland, with an emphasis on the imple-
mentation of national SD policy and a profiling of the province as a ‘director’. 
When it comes to long-term strategic planning to promote SD, the Dutch approach is con-
sidered as pioneering (Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998, p. 32-33). Since the adoption of the first Na-
tional Environmental Policy Plan in 1989, the Netherlands is considered a front-runner (Niestroy, 
2005, p. 208). The plan and its successors were considered as the Dutch SSD, with SD being 
interpreted as the integration of environmental concerns into other policy areas (Lundqvist, 
2004, p. 113; Niestroy, 2005, p. 209). The Netherlands, which is reputed to initiate policies be-
fore other countries (Brans and Maes, 2001, p. 224), also has a strong tradition in policy-mak-
ing on certain key areas of SD, such as climate change or energy (e.g. in the context of transi-
tion management). This early approach has been evaluated as being very ambitious on goals, 
but rather ambivalent on actions (van Muijen, 2000). In the run-up to the Johannesburg Sum-
mit, the Dutch government decided to develop a truly national SSD, rather late in comparison 
to other OECD countries. Political instability during the time muted the ambition of the 
document (Niestroy, 2005, p. 209-210). In 2003, an Action Programme for SD was published 
in two parts, a national and an international one. The international part, lead by the Foreign 
Ministry, focuses on the Johannesburg’s WEHAB themes (Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture, 
Biodiversity) (Ministerie van VROM 2003a). The national part additionally focuses on popula-
tion, mobility, sustainable production and consumption, and knowledge (Ministerie van 
VROM 2003b). Yet the Action Programme mostly refers to existing policy processes when it 
comes to concrete goals and instruments. Respondents confirm it had little impact and should 
rather be considered as an attempt to meet the international call for the development of an 
SSD. Since 2005, attention for SD again grew stronger, partly because of the political mo-
mentum that was created internationally on climate change. The peer review that was con-
ducted on the Dutch SD policy (in the context of the EU SD Strategy) also played a triggering 
role (see Dalal-Clayton and Krikhaar, 2007). SD was mentioned prominently in the 2006 coali-
tion agreement. Informal interdepartmental cooperation followed, which eventually resulted in 
the development of the Cabinet-wide Approach on SD in 2008 (Cramer and Koenders, 2008). 
This approach is meant to carry out the new coalition’s intention, and consists of three tracks: 
sustainable governmental management, societal dialogue on SD, and progress on selected 
themes, which are highly focused on climate change and biodiversity.
9
 The Netherlands does 
not have an SD Council. Progress on the Cabinet-wide Approach on SD is now reported to 
parliament and takes into account, among other things, the Sustainability Monitor collectively 
published by the different planning bureaus (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek et al., 2009). 
Interdepartmental cooperation remains informal, but since 2008 it takes place both at a lower 
administrative level, as well as at the level of directors-general. The political responsibility for 
                                                 
9 The themes are water and climate adaptation; sustainable energy; biofuels and development; CO2 
capture and storage; biodiversity, alimentation and meat; and sustainable building. 
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SD has not been specifically assigned. Behind the scenes, however, the Environment Ministry 
continues to play an important role. 
In North Holland, SD appears high on the political agenda. In the coalition agreement of 
the current executive council,
10
 for instance, SD is included as a key objective (Provincie 
Noord-Holland, 2007). Yet in contrast to some other provinces, North Holland does not have 
an overarching policy document on SD. In many policy areas, however, SD is mentioned as 
the guiding framework, such as in environmental planning, agriculture or economic policy. But 
in the political discourse of North Holland SD is most notably framed as the province’s answer 
to climate change. Increasingly climate change is a key policy issue in North Holland. This has 
many reasons, including the international policy agenda and the inclusion of the Greens in the 
coalition since 2003. It is also socio-geographically motivated, since the province of North 
Holland is particularly vulnerable to sea level rises. But in my view, the focus on climate 
change within the SD agenda is also linked to North Holland’s scope of competences. Because 
of their relatively high autonomy within the domain of spatial planning, the Dutch provinces 
are important partners in the battle against climate change. Climate policy (e.g. adaptation 
measures or renewable energy projects) has an important spatial dimension, which means that 
provinces can make a difference. One of the most important accents in the North Holland 
climate policy is the development of wind energy, for which North Holland is ideally located. 
The province also introduced a ‘climate test’, applied to important council decisions in areas 
such as spatial planning, transport and water. 
In a document leading up to the 2003 Action Programme, the Dutch Environment Ministry 
requests the provinces (as well as communities and water boards) to develop their own SSD, 
partly to help implement the national strategy (Ministerie van VROM 2002, p. 72). Yet in the 
eventual Action Programme that call is not repeated. While one of the main tracks of the cur-
rent Cabinet-wide Approach is to engage in a societal dialogue, the provinces are not men-
tioned at all. The provinces do not have a role to play in the implementation of the Dutch SD 
policy (Niestroy, 2005, p. 205). This stands in contrast with the sectoral cooperation on spe-
cific themes, such as environment and spatial planning, where much coordination is done be-
tween national and provincial governments. Since 2009, cooperation is also strengthened in the 
field of climate change, with the Climate and Energy Agreement between State and Provinces. The only 
mechanism for vertical policy integration for SD is a link between the national SD policy and 
provincial SD initiatives in the form of a nationally financed programme called Learning for SD. 
This programme, which exists since 2003, is intended to anchor SD within provinces (among 
other beneficiaries) by means of financing projects to promote SD and investing in capacity-
building. It is thus a programmatic and a capacity-building instrument. Each province has to 
develop an ambition statement, confirmed by the executive council, in which it expresses its 
view on SD and the priority themes to be supported by the programme. Climate change is the 
main theme in North Holland’s ambition statement (Senternovem, 2008). The document in-
tends to bridge the gap between the general approach on SD and the provincial climate policy. 
The provinces’ weak (even inexistent) role in the implementation of the Dutch SD policy is 
paralleled by their lack of influence in national SD policy-making. North Holland does have 
different influence mechanisms at its disposal to weigh on national decision-making (e.g. the 
North Holland lobbyist in The Hague) but these are not used in the context of SD. The inter-
                                                 
10 The provincial executive council (or States-Deputed) consists of members elected by the States-Pro-
vincial, the provincial assembly. The executive council is chaired by the Queen’s Commissioner, 
appointed by the national government (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 229). 
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provincial pressure organization (IPO) is not active on SD either. Vertical coordination 
mechanisms (including with regard to international decision-making) are only used for sectoral 
cooperation on specific issues. The expectation that North Holland plays a role in the imple-
mentation of the Dutch SD policy, is not met. It is also striking that at both levels there seems 
to be no political climate to coordinate with the other level on the issue of SD. Vertical policy 
integration for SD is thus the weak link of the Dutch SD policy. Programmes such as Learning 
for SD could be used to strengthen the relations between the different levels’ policies, especially 
as provinces become more active on SD. Some new initiatives are also interesting to bear in 
mind in the future, such as the development of a provincial SD benchmark by the govern-
mental agency Senternovem. 
4.2 North Rhine-Westphalia: no strategy to integrate 
North Rhine-Westphalia and the other German Länder (states) score relatively high on self-
rule. The German Constitution allocates some exclusive legislative competences to the Länder 
— e.g. in the domains of education, culture, media and natural resources — and it entrusts the 
residual competences to them (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 193). In Germany most legislative 
responsibilities, however, are concurrent competences,
11
 meaning that the Länder can only 
legislate as long as the federal level has not done so. Important and powerful policy areas such 
as economic policy-making, environment, energy, agriculture and social welfare fall within this 
category (Münch, 2008a, p. 25). In practice, legislation in those fields has most often been 
undertaken by the federal parliament. Schneider (2005, p. 131) therefore states that the political 
balance in Germany lies in favour of the federal government. The principle that federal law 
overrules the law of the Länder further highlights this predominance (Swenden, 2006, p. 53). 
Moreover, the Länder, although they are autonomous when implementing their own laws, are 
also responsible for implementing federal law, which is a hallmark of so-called cooperative feder-
alism (characterized by a division of labour rather than of areas of competences, as is the case 
in dual federalism) (Schneider, 2005, p. 137; Wachendorfer-Schmidt, 2000, p. 81). In the area of 
fiscal policy, powers are very divided, which lowers North Rhine-Westphalia’s score on self-
rule (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 215). Yet on shared rule the German Länder receive the maxi-
mum score in Hooghe et al.’s index. This is mostly because of the far-reaching powers of the 
German upper chamber, the Bundesrat, which represents the Länder and plays an important role 
in the formulation of federal law. Through the Bundesrat, the Länder have a tight grip on federal 
policy-making (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 245). Recent reforms have further increased this dy-
namic, sometimes in exchange for some of the Länder’s competences with regard to self-rule 
(Klaeren, 2008, p. 3; Schneider, 2005, p. 127). 
The Länder thus have a relatively high degree of autonomy, but due to the system of coop-
erative federalism they are intricately intertwined with the federal level (Hooghe et al., 2008b, 
p. 245). This so-called Verflechtung has been identified as an important obstacle to flexible pol-
icy-making. The German federal system is conceived in such a way that both levels cannot op-
erate independently from one another, with a relative concentration of legislative powers at the 
federal level and an extensive decentralization of implementation responsibilities towards the 
Länder. Precisely because the Länder are so closely involved in the implementation of federal 
                                                 
11 The option where the federal government designs framework legislation and leaves specific provi-
sions to the Länder, one of the traditional characteristics of German cooperative federalism, has 
been abolished in a recent reform of federalism (Münch, 2008a, p. 24). 
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policies, an impressive number of formal and informal coordination mechanisms has been set 
up (Münch, 2008b, p. 42; Wachendorfer-Schmidt, 2000, p. 81). These include, for instance, the 
permanent representations of the Länder in Berlin, or the intergovernmental conferences of 
sectoral ministers (federal and subnational). Those conferences house an array of working 
groups in which administrative officials try to reach a better coordination on specific policy 
issues (Jänicke et al., 2001, p. 25). The characteristics of German federalism thus put forward 
that a high degree of cooperation can be expected in the area of SD. They also suggest that 
North Rhine-Westphalia and the other Länder play an important role in the implementation of 
the German SD policy.  
Germany, which has been labelled a pioneer in environmental policy-making, was relatively 
late in taking up the SD challenge (Tils, 2007, p. 164). In 1998, the decision to adopt an SSD 
was included in the coalition agreement of the first red-green government headed by Schröder 
(Niestroy, 2005, p. 136; OECD, 2002a, p. 127). It was not until 2002, however, that the SSD 
saw the light (Bundesregierung, 2002). In general, it did not have very high ambitions, with the 
exception of some unusual goals, such as limiting the daily use of new terrain for construction 
to 30 hectares by 2020 (Bachus et al., 2004, p. 225). The SSD’s goals are concrete and measur-
able, and come accompanied by indicators. They have been reviewed in progress reports in 
2004 and in 2008 (Bundesregierung, 2004; 2008). Those reports also serve as updates to the 
strategy itself, and as an occasion for the government to adapt the goals to its political priori-
ties. In 2008, for instance, Merkel’s government decided to no longer observe a deadline for 
the goal to achieve a part of 20% of organic farming, since Germany is still far from that figure 
and reportedly because it did not fit the political views of the coalition. On the positive side, 
the goal for renewable energy was tightened, as the previously set target had already been 
achieved long before the deadline. Yet the latest report also shows that two thirds of the goals 
have not been achieved, which raises the question about the strategy’s impact. Previous studies 
have also highlighted the isolated position of the SSD, which does not interfere with other im-
portant policy processes (Niestroy, 2005, p. 136; Tils, 2007, p. 172). The responsibility of the 
SSD lies with the Chancellor’s Office, which is why SD in Germany is labelled a Chefsache. The 
head of the Chancellor’s Office chairs the State Secretary Committee on SD,
12
 a horizontal 
coordination body in which all ministries are represented. Every ministry also has to report on 
its progress on SD. The Environment Ministry assumes an important role, e.g. by taking the 
lead on the SD indicators and by representing the federal government in certain multilateral 
bodies. The German SD policy receives advice from the multistakeholder German Council on 
SD, a generally well-respected body (Niestroy, 2005, p. 145). Follow-up is also assured by the 
Bundestag, the parliament’s lower chamber, where in 2004 a Parliamentary Advisory Committee 
on SD was created. This advisory committee knows no counterpart in other countries 
(Niestroy, 2005, p. 136). Unlike normal parliamentary commissions, it works with unanimity to 
adopt stances. It will most probably also play a role in the future sustainability impact assess-
ment, the newest instrument of the German governance model for SD (Bundesregierung, 
2008, p. 33; Merkel et al., 2009, p. 30-31). 
At the subnational level, the SD image is very diversified. Kern (2008, p. 125) illustrates that 
the SD initiatives taken by German Länder draw on three different concepts: Agenda 21, global 
governance, and so-called ‘new environmental policy instruments’. In 2000, North Rhine-
Westphalia was one of the Länder that decided to develop an Agenda 21 process. It was a de-
                                                 
12 In Germany, state secretaries are the heads of a ministry. It is an administrative function, but often 
filled-in by political colour (Niestroy, 2005, p. 138).  
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mand of the Green party, that had just renewed its coalition with the Social Democrats.
13
 
Agenda 21 North Rhine-Westphalia was an extensive consultation process set around a num-
ber of themes determined by the government, and in which the Environment Ministry, held by 
the Greens, took the lead (Bachus et al., 2004, p. 234-235). The process was supported by a 
State Secretary Committee for SD. The government also set up a multistakeholder body, the 
Future Council, characterized by a unique membership that brought together personalities 
from the academic world, business, culture and sports, among others. Its aim was to develop a 
long-term vision for North Rhine-Westphalia to achieve in 2030 (State of North Rhine-West-
phalia, 2004). Most importantly, however, Agenda 21 North Rhine-Westphalia was about con-
crete projects and networks, with the aim to firmly embed the concept of SD within society. 
According to several respondents, Agenda 21 was regarded as a ‘green’ project, with little sup-
port from the senior coalition partner. Nevertheless, the process ended in a report containing 
recommendations for a North Rhine-Westphalian SSD (MUNLV 2005). Yet in 2005 the red-
green coalition was replaced by a black-yellow coalition led by the Christian Democrats who 
had been in opposition for 40 years. This change of government resulted in the complete 
closing-down of the Agenda 21 process and its related institutions. Some themes still play an 
important role within the current government, e.g. land use, but the overarching idea of SD, 
which was explicitly present in the Agenda 21 process, is largely left aside. The policy instru-
ments used during the Agenda 21 period have also been changed, with a less strong emphasis 
on broad participation and concrete societal projects, but strong cooperation between gov-
ernment and other stakeholders on selected policy issues.
14
 The turnover observed in North 
Rhine-Westphalia stands in sharp contrast to the dynamic at federal level, where the institu-
tions for SD have been further developed by coalitions of different compositions, and where 
SD does not appear to be identified as ‘green fiddling’. 
The constitutional situation of the German federal government allows it to broach every 
theme or domain it wants to, even if it does not have the full legislating powers on those 
topics. This also happens in the area of SD (Bachus et al., 2004, p. 226). The SSD, for instance, 
includes goals on education and spatial planning, which fall almost entirely within the compe-
tences of the Länder and of local authorities. In consequence, the implementation and effec-
tiveness of the German SD policy is to a large extent determined by what happens in the 
Länder. Surprisingly, however, until recently no initiatives were taken to ensure vertical policy 
integration. The traditional cooperative mechanisms of German federalism do not apply for 
SD, since it is largely confined to an unbinding strategy and does not entail concrete law-mak-
ing. The Conference of Environment Ministers, which adopted SD as a guiding principle in 
1997 (OECD, 2002a, p. 130), did have a working group on SD issues since 2002, but that 
group did not play a role in the implementation of the SSD (Tils, 2007, p. 168). It rather 
focused on exchange and information-sharing. In 2007, the working group was dissolved and 
replaced by a working group focusing on climate change, and in which the SD community 
now only plays a minor role. The federal government intentionally includes themes falling out-
                                                 
13 The 2000 coalition agreement could be regarded as the formal starting point of the Agenda 21 
process. However, the intention to start up such a process already appeared in several political 
declarations during the first term of the red-green coalition between 1995 and 2000. 
14 Examples include the Dialog Wirtschaft und Umwelt, in which the Environment and Economy 
Ministries coordinate with industry representatives, and the Allianz für die Fläche, that brings 
together the government, local authorities and a number of stakeholders, and that focuses on the 
reduction of land use (MUNLV 2009a; 2009b). 
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side its competences in the SSD, in order to initiate a broad-ranging process of SD. Yet the 
Länder are not involved in the implementation of the SD policy. The SSD does not contain 
concrete incentives for lower levels to act (Tils, 2007, p. 168). As a result of the absence of 
such incentives and the lack of coordination mechanisms for SD, the SSD did not trigger new 
developments at Länder level (Niestroy, 2005, p. 141). Rather, SD initiatives in the Länder were 
unrelated to the governance processes at federal level, also in North Rhine-Westphalia (Bachus 
et al., 2004, p. 233). Although both levels’ policies can have similar themes and instruments 
(e.g. the State Secretary Committee), they are not linked. The call for vertical policy integration 
for SD has sounded loudly in German debates in the past years. The Länder, as well as other 
stakeholders, voiced frustration about not being implicated in the development of the federal 
SSD, while the federal government increasingly realized that cooperation of the Länder was 
needed to achieve the goals of the strategy. The SSD’s 2008 progress report for the first time 
contains a chapter on the Länder contribution to the SSD written by the Conference of Länder 
Minister-Presidents (Bundesregierung, 2008, p. 190-195). Following the report, the Länder re-
quested closer cooperation with the federal government. At a meeting of the federal State 
Secretary Committee on SD, at which the Länder were invited, it was decided that informal 
working groups in which the federal government and a selection of Länder were represented 
would cooperate closely on three specific themes.
15
 The output of those working groups is 
now being discussed in the sectoral conferences of ministers. Some respondents noted that 
agreement among the Länder on certain issues is hampered by political factors (e.g. the most 
recent federal elections, and the elections in some Länder), and that the Länder, although they 
wanted to work more closely with the federal government, are reluctant to adopt texts binding 
them to federal goals
16
 (see also Jänicke et al., 2001, p. 17). North Rhine-Westphalia is no 
active partner in these recent mechanisms for better coordination, which appears to be due to 
the low priority it currently attaches to SD. Cooperation on SD with the federal government 
was better before 2005, but even then the federal SSD and North Rhine-Westphalian Agenda 
21 were two rather isolated governance processes. 
While the federal government supports closer cooperation with the Länder on the imple-
mentation of some of the issues central to its SD policy, involvement of the Länder in decision-
making on its SD policy seems almost inexistent. In contrast to their important position in 
federal law-making, the Länder do not have any say in the federal SSD, which does not pass 
through the Bundesrat but is cabinet-led. During the design of the SSD, the Minister-Presidents’ 
Offices were asked for input by the Chancellor’s Office, but with little response
17
 (Niestroy, 
2005, p. 141). The SSD’s 2004 progress report contained a chapter about the initiatives taken 
at the level of the Länder (Bundesregierung, 2004, p. 31-36), but without linkages to the rest of 
the SSD. Input for that chapter was given by the working group on SD of the Conference of 
Environment Ministers (Niestroy, 2005, p. 142). The input for the 2008 progress report, as 
                                                 
15 These are public procurement, land use and SD indicators. The Länder involved are Baden-Würt-
temberg, Bremen, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony and Thuringia. 
In the selection of the Länder a geographical and a political balance was pursued, as well as a 
balance between ‘city states’ and ‘area states’. 
16 The Länder are also wary to some other forms of cooperation, such as benchmarking initiatives. 
They blocked a proposal made by the German Council for SD to develop an inventory of their SD 
strategies. 
17 In that context it is important to mention that in all Länder SD processes are led by the Environ-
ment Ministries (Jörgensen, 2002, p. 10). 
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previously mentioned, was given by the Conference of Minister-Presidents. But besides this 
input in some federal policy documents, the Länder do not play a role in decision-making for 
the federal SSD. According to respondents, it is not the federal government’s intention to 
broaden the federal strategy to a fully national one (encompassing both the federal and subna-
tional levels). Moreover, they indicate that SD policy-making already requires such an extensive 
coordination effort within the federal government, that further coordination with the sixteen 
Länder would be a bridge too far. In addition, it would probably scale down the strategy’s am-
bition. And even if the Länder would be allowed to play a role in decision-making on the 
federal SD policy, they would firstly have to agree on a position among themselves, which 
seems hard seeing the diversity of their own SD initiatives and the political obstacles hamper-
ing their cooperation in other fields. 
In the German case it is particularly surprising that the Länder are not involved in the 
implementation of the German SSD, nor in the decision-making of federal SD policy. The 
many instruments for intergovernmental relations are not used for SD. Vertical policy integra-
tion for SD will probably continue to fuel debates in the future. An interesting development is 
the recent cooperation between the federal government and selected Länder in informal work-
ing groups, a first step towards a structural instrument for vertical policy integration for SD. In 
general, however, it still appears to be a largely top-down process. From the perspective of the 
Länder, it is clear that they welcome the cooperation, but they are also wary as to giving up 
their autonomy in certain fields in favour of increased cooperation or harmonization. The case 
of North Rhine-Westphalia further suggests that the existence of an elaborate SD process at 
Länder level is a precondition for integration with the national level. 
4.3 Flanders: integration through demarcation 
In Belgium the allocation of competences is based on the principle of exclusive rather than 
concurrent competences. This means that each matter can only pertain to one level of gov-
ernment, i.e. that level has both legislating and implementing responsibilities in that matter 
(Reuchamps and Onclin, 2009, p. 30). Federal laws are thus only binding for the federal 
government. Furthermore, no hierarchy exists between federal and subnational legislation, 
which places Belgium within the category of dual (rather than cooperative) federalism 
(Swenden, 2006, p. 54). Flanders scores 13 on the index of self-rule. It disposes of exclusive 
competences in many important areas such as environment, spatial planning, agriculture, eco-
nomic development, foreign trade, energy policy, health policy, natural resources, transport, 
infrastructure, culture and education (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 185-186; Swenden et al., 2006, 
p. 865-868). While its spending powers are considerable, it does not have a large autonomy 
with regard to taxation (Swenden and Jans, 2006, p. 885). Flanders also has a relatively high 
degree of shared rule, due to the powers the subnational entities have through the Belgian 
federal legislature. According to Swenden and Jans (2006, p. 882), however, the Belgian upper 
chamber fails to defend subnational interests. Yet important to mention is the fact that in ex-
ternal relations, the autonomy of the Belgian subnational entities is exceptional, since they can 
carry out an autonomous external policy, including the conclusion of international treaties, for 
all issues for which they are internally competent (Massart-Piérard, 2009, p. 174; Van den 
Brande, 2009, p. 12-13). 
Flanders has a very high degree of autonomy and some other subnational entities in Europe 
look jealously at its extensive policy portfolio, including in external relations. The dual federal 
system and the principle of exclusive competences, however, does not mean that the different 
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levels can operate independently from one another. In practice competences are extremely 
fragmented, and almost in every policy domain certain aspects remain under federal compe-
tence. This results in a system of frequent consultations, e.g. within interministerial confer-
ences or by means of cooperation agreements (the negotiations of which resemble the conclu-
sion of international treaties) (Reuchamps and Onclin, 2009, p. 32-33). In addition, the fact 
that many competences pertaining to the subnational entities are to a large extent ‘European-
ized’ makes that the subnational entities are obliged to work together with the federal govern-
ment on those issues (Swenden and Jans, 2006, p. 886). A relatively important coordination 
effort between the two levels can thus be expected for SD. 
At the level of the federal government, the first initiatives on SD were triggered by the Rio 
Summit. Belgium is said to be a frontrunner, due to the early creation of a National (later re-
named Federal) Council for SD and the adoption of the federal SD act in 1997 (Rombouts, 
2003, p. 36). This act originates a complex institutional framework which obliges the govern-
ment to adopt four-yearly SD plans and two-yearly SD reports (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1997). The 
reports are drawn up by the Federal Planning Bureau, while the responsibility for the plans lies 
with the Interdepartmental Commission on SD. This horizontal coordination body comprises 
representatives of the different federal departments and of federal ministerial cabinets,
18
 as well 
as representatives from the subnational governments, although theoretically the latter are only 
observers. In 2002 a separate SD administration was established, the Federal Public Planning 
Service SD, to oversee the preparation and implementation of the federal SD policy. Hori-
zontal integration is also pursued by means of SD units in each federal department (Mazijn and 
Gouzée, 2007, p. 6). The newest instrument of the federal SD policy is the Sustainability Im-
pact Assessment, the importance of which is, however, still unclear (Lambrecht and Hens, 
2007, p. 7-11). Important to mention as well is the inclusion of SD in the Belgian constitution, 
stating that SD is a general policy goal of all governments, federal and subnational (Belgische 
Senaat, 2007, art. 7bis). In the federal government, political responsibility for SD has shifted 
with each change of government. Although the institutional cycle of plans and reports remains 
unaffected, interviews point out that those shifts have had a large impact on the political dy-
namic regarding SD, especially depending on the specific combination of competences of the 
minister or state secretary in question.
19
 Although the institutional framework on SD is well 
developed, the federal SD policy is criticized for its lack of implementation. Observers also 
denounce the lack of linkages between the plans and reports, and the ‘shopping list’ character 
of the plans. The plans, which derive their objectives from international SD policy,
20
 have 
quantified objectives, but are not linked to important budget lines. The federal SD policy is 
also criticized for lacking a long-term vision (Niestroy, 2005, p. 80-96). That might change with 
                                                 
18 In comparison to other countries, ministerial cabinets in Belgian governments are large and play an 
important role. They do not only have political functions, but are also the main players in policy 
creation (Brans et al., 2005). 
19 That combination changes regularly and has consequences for the political weight and the amount 
of resources available for SD. At the time of writing, SD is the responsibility of minister Magnette, 
competent for a broad range of issues such as climate, energy, environment and consumer affairs. 
Between 2004 and 2007, state secretary Van Weert had only SD and social economy in her portfo-
lio. (In Belgium, a state secretary is a ‘junior minister’ who belongs to the cabinet, but is accountable 
to a specific minister or to the prime minister.) 
20 The first plan (2000-2004) is influenced by the goals of Agenda 21, the second plan (2004-2008) is 
structured according to the thematic challenges of the EU SD Strategy (Niestroy, 2005, p. 86, 96). 
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a proposed modification of the federal SD act, which calls for the development of a federal 
long-term vision on SD. 
While the federal SD policy was influenced by the Rio Summit, SD at the Flemish level was 
largely triggered by the Johannesburg Summit, at which a Flemish delegation participated. 
After Johannesburg, a few civil servants established an informal working group on SD within 
the Flemish administration, partly to coordinate international SD activities.
21
 The Flemish SD 
policy was institutionalized in 2004 when, as part of a reorganization of the Flemish admini-
stration, the coordination of SD — as well as some other horizontal policy issues — became 
the responsibility of the Minister-President. A small SD Team was established within the 
Minister-President’s administration, and assumed the coordination of the working group on 
SD, which comprises a representative of each policy domain. The Flemish governance model 
for SD proclaims minimal coordination, meaning that the individual ministers are in charge of 
integrating SD within their policy areas, and that the SD Team only provides the needed ca-
pacity-building and some coordination through the interdepartmental working group 
(Spillemaeckers and Bachus, 2009, p. 7). In 2006 the Minister-President issued the first phase 
of the Flemish SSD, which is mainly a framework text laying out strategic objectives 
(structured around the thematic issues of the EU SD Strategy), and displaying the institutional 
steps taken to anchor SD (Vlaamse Regering, 2007). The second phase of the SSD is consti-
tuted of a series of twelve operational projects, which have only recently been approved. Those 
projects are also connected to a certain amount of subsidies to be allocated by the SD Team 
(Vlaamse overheid, 2009). The Flemish SD policy has a legal basis. A decree passed in 2008 
obliges each Flemish government to adopt a new SSD within the first ten months of its 
swearing-in (Vlaams Parlement, 2008). Participation of stakeholders happens through the tradi-
tional advisory councils, who regularly advise the government on parts of its SD policy. In 
comparison to the other subnational governments in Belgium, Flanders has a relatively well-
developed institutional framework for SD. Yet the Flemish SSD is rather weak and its goals are 
noncommittal. Although the government has issued two reports with indicators on SD 
(Studiedienst van de Vlaamse Regering, 2006; 2008), those are not related to an evaluation of 
the SSD. Furthermore, the SD policy does not seem to have a substantial impact to important 
policy processes, such as the long-term development plan Flanders In Action.
22
 
As a consequence of the dual character of Belgian federalism, the subnational governments 
are not involved in the implementation of the federal SD policy. The federal and Flemish 
strategies exclusively take place within the limits of each level’s competences. Respondents 
point out that drawing up a federal SD plan is therefore a delicate matter, because of the lim-
ited federal competences. The federal plans traditionally have a relatively small environmental 
dimension but a strong social emphasis (Niestroy, 2005, p. 96), since environment is mostly a 
subnational responsibility. Federal policy is in no way binding to the subnational level, which 
may have contributed to the fact that Flanders has been little inspired by the federal govern-
ance model for SD when it designed its own model (although the reluctance of the Belgian 
subnational governments to accept a federal ‘frame’ also plays a role here). The federal and 
                                                 
21 In the margins of the Johannesburg Summit, Flanders co-founded nrg4SD, a transnational network 
of subnational governments aimed at information-sharing and at strengthening the role of subnati-
onal governments in global decision-making for SD. Especially during the first years of nrg4SD’s 
existence, Flanders was an active member of the network (Happaerts et al., 2010).  
22 The project does make some references to SD, but those are not linked to the Flemish SSD nor to 
the institutions governing the Flemish SD policy. 
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Flemish strategies are thus characterized by different themes and instruments, with the largest 
degree of freedom at the Flemish level. Both, however, are strongly impacted by global and 
European governance processes. References to international commitments are commonplace 
in Belgian politics, because it is easier to agree on external requirements than to rely on intra-
Belgian negotiations (see also Niestroy, 2005, p. 97). 
Several structural instruments allow Flanders to influence decision-making on the federal SD 
policy, most importantly membership in an SD Council (the Federal Council for SD) and 
involvement in an interdepartmental SD committee (the Interdepartmental Commission on 
SD). Flanders proactively uses those mechanisms, not only to provide genuine input for the 
federal SD plans, but also to guard against federal trespassing on subnational competences. 
Out of all the subnational governments Flanders is by far the most active participant in na-
tional coordination mechanisms for SD. Respondents explain this through the absence of a 
comparably well-developed SD policy in other entities, but Flanders was already an active 
partner before the institutionalization of its SD policy. The personal commitment of some civil 
servants and a Flemish policy of attendance appear important determining factors. In 2004, the 
federal State Secretary for SD took the initiative of inviting the subnational governments to 
negotiate a national SSD (encompassing both the federal and the subnational governments), 
inspired by international commitments. The negotiations took place within an ad hoc Intermin-
isterial Commission on SD. The idea was to offer an added value to the initiatives taken at the 
different levels, although some rather thought of a national strategy as a mere sum of the ex-
isting federal and subnational strategies. The subnational negotiators, in particular, were hesi-
tant to advance. Flanders was reluctant to agree on any national strategy before finalizing its 
own. The negotiations ended in nothing more than a framework text proclaiming good inten-
tions (IMCDO 2005). Afterwards, however, no new initiatives were taken to restart the 
process and the interministerial commission was dissolved. Yet further intergovernmental 
cooperation on SD can be envisaged, because some subnational governments such as Flanders 
have in the meantime taken steps to institutionalize SD. At Flemish request, the framework 
text mentions the possibility of concluding cooperation agreements for SD (IMCDO 2005, 
§19). Flanders wants such an agreement to focus, inter alia, on the Belgian mandate and 
representation in multilateral bodies for SD, such as the EU, the UN and the OECD. Flanders 
is a very active member in the Belgian delegations to these bodies (see, e.g., Van den Brande, 
2009) and wants to further increase its visibility in them (Peeters, 2009, p. 28). It therefore 
considers such a cooperation agreement as a necessary step in the institutionalization of its SD 
policy (De Saegher, 2009). 
In the Belgian case subnational governments have the opportunity to influence decision-
making on the federal SD policy, but they are not involved in the implementation of it. The 
opportunities are used by Flanders, to a considerable extent with a strategy of demarcation, i.e. 
guarding against federal trespassing on subnational competences. Niestroy (2005, p. 77) states 
that Belgium’s complex institutional construction leads to an emphasis on cooperation on pro-
cedures rather than on substance. When looking specifically at the allocation of competences 
and the degree of autonomy of the subnational governments, one needs to conclude that a 
very large share of the policy areas that are key to SD, such as energy, environment, economy 
and education, pertains to the powers of the subnational governments. Much therefore de-
pends on the willingness of those subnational governments, including the advance towards 
greater vertical policy integration. An important development in that context will be whether 
Flanders and its peers decide to cooperate with the federal government on the future vision on 
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SD foreseen in the modification of the federal SD act, in order to make it a truly national long-
term vision for SD in Belgium. 
4.4 Quebec: governing in solitude 
With a maximum score on self-rule the Canadian provinces have the highest autonomy within 
their own jurisdictions of all subnational governments worldwide. Canada is therefore labelled 
as one of the most decentralized federations (Bakvis and Skogstad, 2002, p. 4; Simeon and 
Papillon, 2006, p. 92; Tomblin, 2000, p. 146). Canadian provinces have wide-ranging compe-
tences in areas such as agriculture, environment, energy, education and immigration, and they 
have exclusive ownership over public lands and natural resources (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 
188; Poirier, 2009, p. 111-112; Simeon and Papillon, 2006, p. 103-114). Canada also has a very 
decentralized fiscal system, with many taxing powers reserved for the provinces (Hooghe et al., 
2008b, p. 213; Simeon and Papillon, 2006, p. 103). For some areas, Quebec has even more 
competences than the other provinces and territories, since it has acquired opt-outs for issues 
it deems central to its identity and nation-building. That is for instance the case for education, 
health and immigration (Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 188). In most issues, however, the distribu-
tion of competences in Canada is unclear. This is due to the fact that the Constitution, written 
in 1867, does not provide clarity, and many times courts must decide in allocating competences 
(Poirier, 2009, p. 108-110). Environment is such an area where the division of competences is 
not well-defined (Hoberg and Harrison, 1994, p. 124). Especially for new policy areas this lack 
of clarity can be a problem (Simeon and Papillon, 2006, p. 102). As a consequence, many 
issues are characterized by incoherent and sometimes contradictory policies (Skogstad, 2000, p. 
72; Tomblin, 2000, p. 146; see also VanNijnatten and Boardman, 2009, p. xix). Also for 
matters important to SD such incoherence has been observed (OECD, 2002a, p. 44). Both 
levels of government have such a wide range of responsibilities and instruments that they can 
design and conduct policies in nearly every domain they want (Simeon and Papillon, 2006, p. 
115). When it comes to shared rule, the situation is somewhat different. Mainly due to the fact 
that the provinces have no say in federal policy-making through the parliament, their degree of 
shared rule is relatively low (Bakvis and Skogstad, 2002, p. 5; Hooghe et al., 2008b, p. 241). 
Also in the international arena the Canadian provinces have only limited access, in spite of 
their large share of competences and the wide-ranging external relations of some provinces 
such as Quebec (see also Paquin, 2010). 
It is clear that Quebec has an extremely high degree of autonomy, especially with regard to 
self-rule. However, the absence of provincial influence in federal law-making, the hazy distri-
bution of competences and the consequent interdependence between the two levels of 
governance have resulted in an extensive system of formal and informal intergovernmental 
relations, such as sectoral councils of federal and provincial ministers. Moreover, a large num-
ber of intergovernmental agreements have been signed, although Quebec has not always joined 
them
23
 (Bakvis and Skogstad, 2002, p. 4; Fournier, 2009, p. 49-50; Poirier, 2009, p. 116-117). 
The federal dynamic in Canada is often characterized by a bipolar relationship of Quebec ver-
sus the rest of Canada (Fournier, 2009, p. 50). I thus expect vertical policy integration in the 
case of Quebec to be difficult rather than evident. 
                                                 
23 An often cited example is the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization, that has not 
been endorsed by Quebec (Toner, 2000, p. 82-83; Winfield, 2002). 
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Stirred by the activities of the Brundtland Commission and the upcoming Rio Summit, the 
Canadian Conservative government issued the Green Plan in 1990, to be presented in Rio as its 
SSD (Tarasofsky, 2007, p. 4). Yet the Green Plan was mainly an environmental action plan, 
committed to additional spending on the environment (Hoberg and Harrison, 1994; OECD, 
2002a, p. 46). After Rio, the Conservative Environment Minister Charest launched his Projet de 
Société, a multistakeholder partnership intended to transform the former Green Plan into a full-
blown SSD, in keeping with the Rio commitments. The process, however, failed after the 
disappearance of political momentum and because of organizational difficulties (Tarasofsky, 
2007, p. 6; Toner, 2000, p. 61-62). The subsequent Liberal government abandoned the Green 
Plan and institutionalized SD through the conception of its Guide to Green Government (Toner, 
2000, p. 64). This document, along with an amendment to the Auditor General Act, prescribes 
that each of the thirty or so departments develop 3-yearly SD strategies displaying the activities 
they undertake to promote SD. The process is led by the Environment Ministry, which has 
until now overseen four rounds of departmental SD strategies. At the same time, the post of 
Commissioner of the Environment and SD was created within the office of the Auditor 
General of Canada,
24
 an independent position accountable only to parliament. The 
Commissioner’s task is to audit the implementation of the federal environment and SD poli-
cies.
25
 The Canadian approach to SD, which is decentralized and strongly environmentally fo-
cused, is criticized for not introducing new policy measures. The departmental SD strategies 
have the tendency to be catalogues of existing actions, and they are not linked to a budget (see 
also Toner, 2000, p. 65). Furthermore, the strategies are not ratified by the government and 
many of them are said to be made by junior-level officials (Toner and Meadowcroft, 2009, p. 
83). The impact of the Commissioner’s reports is reportedly low (Tarasofsky, 2007, p. 8). With 
a strong environmental interpretation, the social dimension of SD is marginal in the Canadian 
SD policy (Bachus et al., 2004, p. 207). Another observed weakness is the lack of an overarch-
ing federal SSD guiding the departmental strategies (Toner and Meadowcroft, 2009, p. 84). Yet 
that is due to change, after the adoption in 2008 of the Federal SD Act (Parliament of Canada, 
2008). The Act calls for the development of a federal SSD containing objectives to which the 
departmental strategies have to adhere. Interviews announce that the first SSD, which is being 
drafted by the Environment Ministry, will again have a mainly environmental focus.  
Even if Canada was perceived as an early SD champion because of its activeness in the run-
up to the Brundtland Report and the Rio Summit (Tarasofsky, 2007, p. 48), the Liberal govern-
ment of Quebec was at least equally early in putting SD on its agenda. In 1988 it was the first 
Canadian government to create a Round Table on Environment and Economy
26
 (Bachus et al., 
2004, p. 217). Three years later, it established an interdepartmental committee on SD (Comité 
interministériel de développement durable), a horizontal coordination body which represents all 
departments at director-general level, still active today. The debate on SD simmered on under 
the subsequent governments led by the sovereignist Parti Québécois, during which time many 
reports on SD were made and presented at global meetings. Yet no concrete SD strategy or 
                                                 
24 The Auditor General of Canada is an officer of Parliament with a broad mandate to audit federal 
departments, agencies and federal organizations. 
25 For a critique on the position of the Commissioner, see Toner and Meadowcroft (2009, p. 85). 
26 In 1987, the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers recommended the esta-
blishment of such round tables in order to institutionalize multistakeholder participation for SD 
(Toner, 2000, p. 58). 
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plan was produced. That idea gained momentum when the Liberals, led by former federal 
Conservative Environment Minister Charest, came back into power in 2003. After the example 
of his experiences in the federal government, Charest instructed his Environment Minister to 
develop a ‘green plan’. At the recommendation of the public and civil society, the Environ-
ment Ministry turned it into an SD plan, which was presented for public consultation together 
with an ambitious SD Act. The Act, passed in 2006, intends to promote SD in Quebec by 
firmly embedding it into public administration (Assemblée Nationale, 2006). It calls for an SSD 
and for the development of SD action plans by each department and public organism, around 
150 in total. Furthermore, the Act creates the position of an SD Commissioner within the of-
fice of the Auditor General of Quebec. The Commissioner has to audit the government with 
regard to SD and report to parliament on the implementation of the SD Act, including on the 
compliance of the SD principles. One of the ambitious components of the Act, indeed, is the 
definition of no less than sixteen principles which need to guide the integration of SD into 
public administration. The Act also adds the right to a healthful environment and one in which 
biodiversity is preserved to Quebec’s Charter of human rights and freedoms (see Halley, 2005, 
p. 70-78). The SSD and the action plans have now been made public, and the government is 
currently developing its SD indicators (see Gendron et al., 2009). The SSD covers a large the-
matic scope, focusing not only on environmental and economic issues, but also referring to 
social, political and cultural matters. Although Quebec’s approach is applauded for its ambi-
tions and for its strong legal foundation, observers and respondents denounce the weakness of 
the SSD and the action plans, and the fact that they do not transcend the realm of public 
administration. The SSD contains a large number of objectives, which are not measurable, 
time-bound or linked to a budget.
27
 Furthermore, critics fear that the Environment Ministry
28
 
does not have the necessary clout to compel other departments to comply with the SSD 
(Gendron, 2005, p. 25). Although it has established an SD Coordination Bureau, mandated to 
oversee the development of the action plans and to develop capacity-building instruments, the 
Environment Ministry’s role given by the SD Act largely exceeds its capacities. However, the 
institutionalization of SD in Quebec is an ongoing process and too recent to be fully judged. In 
the near future it will be interesting to see how the SD indicators develop, what the impact of 
the SD Commissioner is, and how the government decides to concretely deal with the SD 
principles.  
In reference to a famous novel, Pelletier (2009, p. 79) writes that the two major communities 
in Canada — the English-speakers living mainly outside Quebec and the French-speakers that 
live primarily in Quebec — coexist side by side in ‘two solitudes’. The same thing could be said 
about the federal and Quebec SD policies, that take place within their respective scope of 
competences, with no linkages existing between the two. In both governments, SD policy is 
largely conceived as making governmental actions more sustainable, with until now little im-
pact outside the governmental realm. Cooperation between federal and provincial govern-
ments is still very sectoral. The Canadian Council of Ministers for the Environment, for 
instance, does not discuss SD as such, but focuses only on specific topics such as water, air or 
                                                 
27 Some economic instruments, however, have been put in place. The SD Act creates a Green Fund to 
finance environmental measures to promote SD. Earlier, the sovereignist government in 2000 esta-
blished the Quebec Action Fund for SD (Fonds d’action québécois pour le développement dura-
ble), which evolved into an association without lucrative purpose that funds projects aimed at pro-
moting behavioural change for SD. 
28 Interestingly, the ministry was renamed Ministry of SD, Environment and Parks in 2005. 
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waste (and recently climate change). Because of the characteristics of Canadian federalism, the 
federal SD policy has no impact on Quebec. It is striking, however, that the Quebec approach 
to SD resembles the federal policy in many ways, e.g. the Commissioner or the departmental 
plans. Part of the explanation is, of course, that Quebec’s Prime Minister is a former federal 
Environment Minister. Yet Quebec’s approach also seems to have learned from the weak-
nesses of the federal model, e.g. by developing a government-wide strategy before demanding 
departmental action plans. It is more ambitious, because of the firm legal basis with an empha-
sis on the integration of SD principles, and because of the fact that it exceeds the governmen-
tal departments and covers near to 150 public organisms. The Quebec model is also much less 
limited to the environmental dimension,
29
 and this is where its degree of autonomy comes in. 
Quebec’s policy scope is simply so wide that a spectrum of areas can be covered by its SD 
policy. Whereas the limited competences of the federal level might partly explain why its policy 
is focused on the environment, an area where competences are not always clearly divided. 
Both levels govern in ‘solitude’ also because the provinces have no access at all to decision-
making on the federal SD policy. Their level of shared rule points out that their power in 
Ottawa is minimal, and respondents confirm that this is true in the area of SD as well. Quebec 
has not undertaken any attempts to do so either. Yet the Quebec governments, both sover-
eignist and Liberal, are very much interested in participating in multilateral decision-making for 
SD (e.g. in the UN Commission on SD). But seeing its limited degree of shared rule, access is 
not automatic. Besides seeking involvement in Canadian delegations, Quebec therefore also 
tries to gain access through routes that bypass the national level, e.g. by cooperating with 
NGOs such as The Climate Group.  
My expectation that vertical policy integration for SD would be rather difficult in the case of 
Quebec was a right one. The SD policies of the federal and the Quebec government are strictly 
separated from one another, with no attempt of coordination between the two. Intergovern-
mental cooperation in Canada happens for specific sectoral issues, but not for SD as an over-
arching policy concept. 
5. Vertical policy integration for sustainable development: 
comparative perspectives 
In the four cases examined, different mechanisms for vertical policy integration for SD can be 
discerned. In the case of North Holland, a link exists between the national SD policy and pro-
vincial SD initiatives. The link is made up by a programmatic and capacity-building instrument, 
but it is rather a weak one. It makes a formal connection between the policies of both levels, 
but it does not bring them closer together. In the cases of North Rhine-Westphalia and Flan-
ders, structural instruments are used for vertical policy integration, i.e. involvement in an SD 
council and in interministerial committees for SD. Those instruments offer large access to 
Flanders in decision-making on the Belgian federal SD policy, but they have only exceptionally 
been used in the German case. A more recent initiative for a structural instrument in Germany 
concerns a real institutionalized mechanism for better coordination, but so far North Rhine-
Westphalia has not been involved in that mechanism. In the last case of the analysis, Quebec, 
absolutely no mechanisms for vertical policy integration for SD were found. 
                                                 
29 Some observers argue that the SSD completely drowns the environmental dimension (e.g. Gendron 
et al., 2007). 
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Looking at this paper’s first research question, it was expected that the cases with a lower 
degree of self-rule would play a large role in the implementation of national SD policies. In the 
Netherlands and Germany, that is usually the case in traditional policy areas. For SD, however, 
the picture is quite different. The Dutch provinces have no part to play whatsoever in the 
national SD policy. In Germany only recently initiatives have been initiated to start working 
with Länder, but North Rhine-Westphalia did not get involved. As for the subnational govern-
ments with the highest degree of self-rule, in my analysis Flanders and Quebec, I expected 
rather isolated SD policies, seeing the dual character of Belgian and Canadian federalism, but 
with attempts of coordination. Coordination does happen in the case of Flanders, but not in 
the case of Quebec. In general, it appears that in many cases, governance for SD at the 
national level is conceived as a purely governmental policy, formulated and implemented by 
national governments, with little effects for the subnational level. For their part, the subna-
tional governments turn upon themselves, and conduct an SD policy that is enacted within the 
borders of their competences, in line with their political priorities and without clear linkages 
with the national level. While Lafferty and Meadowcroft said that SD had been invoked to jus-
tify shifts of responsibilities between different levels of government (cf supra), it is clear that 
competences do not follow from SD, SD follows from competences. Each government at-
tempts to conduct an SD policy within the framework of its own autonomy. Even subnational 
governments with a low degree of self-rule can do so. In the analysis it rather appeared that 
most difficulties are experienced at the national level, e.g. in Belgium and Canada, where the 
high degree of self-rule of the subnational entities restricts the freedom of movement of na-
tional governments. In contrast, the SD policies of Flanders and Quebec mostly resemble the 
policies of national governments, with a government-wide strategy, a legal basis and ambitions 
to be involved in multilateral decision-making for SD. Degree of self-rule is thus an important 
factor determining the content of SD policies of subnational governments, and it has an im-
pact on the freedom of movement of national governments. However, only to a limited degree 
does it shape the subnational governments’ position towards efforts undertaken to achieve 
greater vertical policy integration.
30
 
As for my second research question, all subnational governments appear to have very lim-
ited authority to shape national decision-making for SD. Only in the case of Flanders (which 
does not have the largest degree of shared rule) possibilities exist to influence decision-making 
for federal (and international) SD policy, and those possibilities are abundantly used. That 
contrasts with North Rhine-Westphalia (the case with the highest degree of shared rule), that is 
not involved in the recent effort for better coordination on SD. But in most cases, it is said 
that intra-governmental cooperation for SD is already such a hard task, that additional coordi-
nation with subnational governments would be practically impossible. The fact that the 
Netherlands, Germany and Canada each have to count with twelve or more subnational enti-
ties could play a role here, whereas Belgium has only five, the governments of which are all 
located relatively close to Brussels (which facilitates intergovernmental cooperation).
31
 The 
degree of shared rule of subnational governments thus does not seem relevant in governance 
                                                 
30 A suggestion for further research would be to test this hypothesis by means of a large-N study con-
trasting the degree of self-rule of a large number of subnational entities with existing mechanisms 
for vertical policy integration for SD. 
31 A similar argument is made by Toner and Meadowcroft (2009, p. 80) who claim that federal states 
that are geographically extensive face a particularly difficult challenge with regard to policy cohe-
rence for SD. 
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for SD, since it is largely based upon the authority of subnational governments in national leg-
islation, while SD policies are mostly executive strategies conducted outside of national parlia-
ments.
32
 In the cases investigated in this paper, no causal link could be drawn with the degree 
of shared rule of a subnational government and the amount of influence it can exert on na-
tional decision-making for SD. 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis of vertical policy integration seen from the perspective of four subnational 
governments paints a grim picture. The general goal of vertical policy integration, reaching 
better policy coherence between different levels of government, is not met. That conclusion is 
in line with previous analyses of governance for SD at the national level. This paper further 
suggests that SD policies, both at the national and at the subnational level, are to be under-
stood as executive policies which have little or no influence outside the governmental realm 
and no impact on other levels of governance. 
Weak vertical policy integration for SD can to a certain extent be explained by the fact that 
in all countries, both federal and unitary, competences are shared between national and subna-
tional governments. The normative discourse of international policy documents (e.g. the need 
for coherent action at all levels of governance) indeed clashes with the reality within countries, 
where responsibilities are divided and one level of government’s freedom of movement is 
restricted by the other. The degree of self-rule of subnational governments is most relevant in 
this dynamic, with significant influence on policy content, while shared rule appears less de-
termining in governance for SD. 
Yet the degree of autonomy of subnational governments and the distribution of compe-
tences within a country are not the only factors accounting for weak vertical policy integration. 
Other factors have to be taken in consideration too. In my analysis, political factors seem very 
determining in how SD is conceived (or framed) within different governments, how it is 
translated into governance mechanisms, and how governments manage the challenge of inte-
gration with other levels. Further research should therefore take into account the political 
weight attached to SD, and the influence of political factors both on the SD policies itself, as 
well as on vertical policy integration for SD. Further research could also focus on the influence 
of international governance processes on SD initiatives at the subnational level, since this pa-
per suggests that such influence differs from case to case, and since it is an important aspect of 
the multi-level architecture of SD. 
This paper approached a previously examined problem from a new angle, i.e. from the per-
spective of subnational governments. It has shown that not only national governments should 
be blamed when vertical policy integration for SD is insufficient. The strategies and political 
priorities of subnational governments are at least equally important. It is true that national 
governments have the main responsibility for initiating cooperation with subnational govern-
ments. But to make that cooperation successful is a shared responsibility. 
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